The paper discusses and compares recent proposals by Carroll and Chen and Barbour et al. to explain the (thermodynamic) arrow of time without a Past Hypothesis, i.e. the assumption of a special (low-entropy) initial state. Defining a Boltzmann entropy for a classical gravitating universe, we argue that Newtonian gravity might actually provide examples for typical macrohistories as envisioned by Carroll and Chen. We then discuss the issue of predictions and retrodictions in such a universe and highlight the advantages of the relational theory proposed by Barbour et al.
The easy and the hard problem of irreversibility
What is the difference between past and future? Why do so many physical processes occur in only one time direction, despite the fact that they are governed or described, on the fundamental level, by time-symmetric microscopic laws? These questions are intimately linked to the notion of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics. From the point of view of fundamental physics, it is the second law of thermodynamics that accounts for such phenomena as that gases expand rather than contract, that glasses break but don't spontaneously reassemble, that heat flows from hotter to colder bodies, that a car slows down and doesn't accelerate once you stop hitting the gas. All these are examples of irreversible processes, associated with an increase of entropy in the relevant physical system. Goldstein (2001) -possibly inspired by Chalmers' discussion of the mind-body problem (Chalmers, 1995) -distinguishes between the easy part and the hard part of the problem of irreversibility. The easy part of the problem is: Why do isolated systems in a state of low entropy typically evolve into states of higher entropy (but not the other way round)? The answer to this question was provided by Ludwig Boltzmann who reduced the second law of thermodynamics to the statistical mechanics of point particles. He thereby developed insights and concepts whose relevance goes beyond the confines of any particular microscopic theory.
The first crucial concept of Boltzmann's statistical mechanics is the distinction between micro-and macrostates. Whereas the microstate X(t) of a system is given by the complete specification of its microscopic degrees of freedom, its macrostate M (t) is specified by (approximate) values of "observables" that characterize the system on macroscopic scales (typical examples are volume, pressure, temperature, magnetization, and so on). The macroscopic state of a system is completely determined by its microscopic configuration, that is M (t) = M (X(t)), but one and the same macrostate can be realized by a large (in general infinite) number of different microstates, all of which "look macroscopically the same". Partitioning the microscopic state space into sets corresponding to macroscopically distinct configurations is therefore called coarse-graining. Turning to the phase space picture of Hamiltonian mechanics for an N -particle system, a microstate corresponds to one point X = (q, p) in phase space Ω ∼ = R 3N × R 3N , q = (q 1 , . . . , q N ) being the position-and p = (p 1 , . . . , p N ) the momentum-coordinates of the particles, whereas a macrostate M corresponds to an entire region Γ M ⊆ Ω of phase space ("macroregion"), namely the set of all microstates coarse-graining to M . Boltzmann then realized that for macroscopic systems -that is, systems with a very large numbers of microscopic degrees of freedom -different macrostates will in general correspond to macroregions of vastly different size, as measured by the pertinent stationary phase space measure (the Lebesgue-or Liouville-measure in case of a classical Hamiltonian system), with the equilibrium state corresponding to the macroregion of by far largest measure, exhausting almost the entire phase space volume. The Boltzmann entropy of a system is now defined as the logarithm of the phase space volume covered by its current macroregion (times a dimensional constant called Boltzmann constant):
Since the entropy is an extensive macrovariable (i.e. of order N , the number of microscopic constituents), we see that the ratio of phase space volume corresponding to macroregions of significantly different entropy values is of the order of exp(N ), where N ∼ 10 24 even for "small" macroscopic systems (the relevant order of magnitude is given by Avogadro's constant). We thus understand why, under the chaotic microdynamics of a many-particle system, a microstate starting in a small (low-entropy) region of phase space will typically evolve into larger and larger macroregions, corresponding to higher and higher entropy, until it reaches the equilibrium state where it will spend almost the entire remainder of its history (that is, apart from rare fluctuations into lower-entropy states). Taken with enough grains of salt, we can summarize this in the slogan that an irreversible (i.e. entropy increasing) process corresponds to an evolution from less likely into more likely macrostates. Notably, the time-reversal invariance of the microscopic laws implies that it cannot be true that all microstates in a low-entropy macroregion Γ M 1 evolve into states of higher entropy. But microconditions leading to an entropy-decreasing evolution are atypicalthey form a subset of extremely small measure -, while nearly all microstates in Γ M 1 evolve into states of higher entropy -entropy increase is typical.
The easy problem of irreversibility can be arbitrarily hard from a technical point of view if one seeks to obtain rigorous mathematical results about the convergence to equilibrium in realistic physical models. It is easy in the sense that, conceptually, Boltzmann's account is well understood and successfully applied in various areas of physicsdespite ongoing (but largely unnecessary) controversies and misconceptions in the philosophical literature (see Lazarovici and Reichert (2015) for a more detailed discussion and a response to common objections).
The hard problem begins with the question: Why do we find systems in low-entropy states to begin with if these states are so unlikely? Often the answer is that we prepared them, creating low-entropy subsystems for the price of increasing the entropy in their environment. But why then is the entropy of this environment so low -most strikingly in the sense that it allows us to exist? If one follows this rationale to the end, one comes to the conclusion that the universe as a whole is in a state of low entropy (that is, globally, in a spatial sense; we don't just find ourselves in a low-entropy pocket in an otherwise chaotic universe) and that this state must have evolved from a state of even lower entropy in the distant past. The latter assumption is necessary to avoid the absurd conclusion that our present macrostate -which includes all our memories and records of the past -is much more likely to be the product of a fluctuation out of equilibrium than of the low-entropy past that our memories and records actually record. In other words: only with this assumption -whose status remains to be discussed -does Boltzmann's account "make it plausible not only that the paper will be yellower and ice cubes more melted and people more aged and smoke more dispersed in the future, but that they were less so (just as our experience tells us) in the past." (Albert (2015, p.5) ; for a good discussion of this issue see also Feynman (1967 , Ch.5), Carroll (2010 In sum, the hard part of the problem of irreversibility is to explain the existence of a thermodynamic arrow of time in our universe, given the fact that the universe is governed, on the fundamental level, by reversible microscopic laws.
Boltzmann's initial response was that our low-entropy past is indeed the product of a random fluctuation (Boltzmann, 1896) ; for assuming that the universum is eternal, arbitrarily deep fluctuations, no matter how unlikely, are bound to occur eventually. But this explanation is highly unsatisfying, Feynman (1967, p. 115 ) even calls it "ridiculous". The reason is that fluctuations which are just deep enough to account for our present macrostate are much more likely -and would occur much more frequently -than fluctuations producing an even lower-entropy past from which the current state could have evolved in accordance with the second law. Hence, taking the probabilistic reasoning seriously, Boltzmann's fluctuation hypothesis leads indeed to the conclusion that our present state is the local entropy minimum, i.e. the product of a random fluctuation rather than a lower-entropy past. By the same token, it compels us to assume that our current fluctuation is not any deeper -and thus more unlikely -than necessary to explain the evidence we already have. To borrow some now famous examples from Feynman (1967) : if you dig in the ground and find a dinosaur bone, you should not expect to find other bones nearby. If you stumble upon a book about Napoleon, you should not expect to find other books containing the same information about a guy called Napoleon. The most extreme form of this reductio ad absurdum is the Boltzmann brain problem: a fluctuation that is just deep enough to account for your empirical evidence (many people claim) would produce only your brain, floating in space, with the rest of the universe at equilibrium. You should thus conclude that this is, by far, the most likely state of the universe you currently experience.
Under the present assumptions, the only possible escape seems to be to add to the microscopic laws the postulate that our universe began in a very low-entropy -and thus very special -macrostate. Albert (2001) coined for this postulate the now famous term Past Hypothesis (PH) .
But what is the status of the Past Hypothesis? In the literature, by and large three different views have been taken towards this question.
1. The low-entropy beginning of our universe requires an explanation.
2. The low-entropy beginning of our universe does not require, or allow, any further explanation. 3. The Past Hypothesis is a law of nature (and therefore does not require or allow any further explanation).
The first point of view is largely motivated by the fact that our explanation of the thermodynamic arrow is based on a typicality reasoning (Lebowitz (1993) , Goldstein (2001) , Lazarovici and Reichert (2015) ). Assuming a low-entropy initial macrostate of the universe, Boltzmann's analysis allows us to conclude that typical microstates relative to this macrostate will lead to a thermodynamic evolution of increasing entropy. It is then not a good question to ask why the actual initial microstate of our universe was among the typical ones. Once a fact about our universe -such as the existence of a thermodynamic arrow -turns out to be typical given the fundamental laws and the relevant boundary conditions, there is nothing left to explain (except, possibly, for the boundary conditions). On the flipside, atypical facts are usually the kind of facts that cry out for further explanation. And to accept the PH is precisely to assume that the initial state of our universe was atypical, relative to all possible microstates, in that it belonged to an extremely small (i.e. very low-entropy) macroregion. Penrose (1999) estimates the measure of this macroregion relative to the available phase space volume to be at most 1 : 10 10 123 -a mind-bogglingly small number. Notably, the explanatory pressure is mitigated by the fact that the PH entails only a special initial macrostate, rather than a microscopic fine-tuning. In the case of a gas in a box, this would be the difference between atypical conditions that one can create with a piston and atypical conditions that one could create only by controlling the exact position and momentum of every single particle in the system. The point here is not that this makes it easier for a hypothetical creator of the universe, but that only the latter (microscopic) kind of finetuning gives rise to the worry that atypical initial conditions could explain anything (and thus explain nothing; cf. Lazarovici and Reichert (2015) ). Nonetheless, the necessity of a Past Hypothesis seems to imply that our actual universe looks very different from a typical model of the fundamental laws of nature -and this is a fact that one can be legitimately worried about.
Figure 2: God picking out the special (low-entropy) initial conditions of our universe. Penrose (1999) .
The second point of view was in particular defended by Callender (2004) . While Callender is also sympathetic to the third option (regarding the PH as a law), he makes the broader case that a) initial conditions are generally not the kind of facts that physics sets out to explain but rather the kind of facts that physics employs as explanantia and b) it is hard to see what a non-question-begging explanation of the PH could possibly consist in. Notably, Ludwig Boltzmann himself eventually arrived at a similar conclusion:
The second law of thermodynamics can be proved from the mechanical theory if one assumes that the present state of the universe, or at least that part which surrounds us, started to evolve from an improbable state and is still in a relatively improbable state. This is a reasonable assumption to make, since it enables us to explain the facts of experience, and one should not expect to be able to deduce it from anything more fundamental. (Boltzmann, 1897) The third option, finally, is most prominently advocated by Albert (2001) and Loewer (2007) in the context of the Best System Account of laws. Upon their view, the laws of nature consist in a) the microscopic dynamical laws b) the PH and c) a probability (or typicality) measure on the initial macroregion. This package has been dubbed the "mentaculus" (Loewer, 2012) . It is supposed to correspond to the best system laws because it strikes the optimal balance between being simple and being informative about the history of our universe (the "Humean mosaic"). In particular, adding b) and c) to the microscopic laws comes at relatively little cost in terms of simplicity but makes the system much more informative, precisely because it accounts for the second law and allows for probabilistic inferences. In addition, Albert and Loewer employ the mentaculus in a sophisticated analysis of counterfactuals, causation, special science laws and more, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
However, tying option 3) -to regard the PH as a law of nature -to Humean metaphysics may be convenient but unnecessary. For (to address also Callender's point), what kind of explanation could the advocates of position 1) possibly look for? Arguably some "nice" and "simple" characterization of the initial macrostate -maybe something along the lines of Roger Penrose's Weyl curvature conjecture (Penrose, 1999) -that would strike us as "law-like". And this is what the Humeans expect, as well. For Albert, at least, the proposition that we should grant the status of a law is not that the universe started in any low-entropy state; the PH, in it's current form, is rather a placeholder for "the macrocondition ... that the normal inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually present to us" (Albert, 2001, p. 96) . And despite common claims to the contrary, we don't see why the anti-Humean is necessarily committed to dynamical laws only (though some of the major anti-Humean positions, such as the production view of Maudlin (2007) , might be). It rather seems to us that if cosmology eventually presented us with a nice and simple and informative characterization of the initial boundary conditions of the universe, we would still have the option to interpret them as a Humean law, or as nomologically necessary in a metaphysically more robust (i.e. anti-Humean) sense. For now, in any case, the crucial point is that we don't yet posses such a characterization of the Past Hypothesis, making the option "PH as a law" somewhat of an open project.
A note on multiverses
Some physicists support the idea of a multiverse (together with an anthropic principle) as the remedy for all sorts of "fine-tuning" problems. Simply put: there exists an entire landscape of actual universes and we find ourselves, unsurprisingly, in one that is hospitable to intelligent life. However, even if there was good evidence in support of a multiverse theory (as some people claim), it is unclear how it would help to avoid the PH. Wouldn't the multiverse contain many more universes populated by Boltzmann brains than by intelligent beings that are the product of biological evolution? Wouldn't we still require a (question begging) hypothesis about how special our universe is? As far as entropic consideration are concerned, a multiverse scenario is quite analogous to Boltzmann's fluctuation scenario. It merely replaces a time-like ensemble (of consecutive low-entropy periods) with an ensemble of universes existing all at once.
Thermodynamic arrow without a Past Hypothesis
In recent years, Sean Carroll together with Jennifer Chen (2004; see also Carroll (2010) ), and Julian Barbour together with Tim Koslowski and Flavio Mercati (2013 , 2014 , 2015 , independently put forward audacious proposals to explain the arrow of time without a Past Hypothesis. While Barbour's arrow of time is not, strictly speaking, an entropic arrow (but rather connected to a certain notion of complexity), Carroll's account is largely based on the Boltzmannian framework, although with a crucial twist. For this reason, we shall focus on the Carroll account first before comparing it to the theory of Barbour et al. in section 5.
The crucial assumption of Carroll and Chen is that the relevant stationary measure on the phase space of the universe is unbounded, allowing for macrostates of arbitrarily high entropy. Hence, simply put, every macrostate is a non-equilibrium state from which the entropy can typically increase in both time directions, defining a thermodynamic arrow -or rather two opposite ones -on either side of the entropy minimum. A typical entropy curve (one hopes) would thus be roughly parabolic or "U-shaped", attaining its global minimum at some moment in time and growing monotonously (modulo small fluctuations) in both directions of this vertex (Fig. 3) . Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati (2015) describe such a profile as "one-past-two futures", the idea being that observers on each branch of the entropy curve would identify the direction of the vertex -which the authors name the Janus point -as their past.
The Carroll model is intriguing because it is based on the bold, yet plausible assumption that the universe has no equilibrium state -a crucial departure from the "gas in the box" paradigm that is still guiding most discussions about the thermodynamic history of the universe. And it is particularly intriguing for anybody worried about the status of the Past Hypothesis, because it seeks to establish the existence of a thermodynamic arrow of time as a feature of typical universes. This is in notable contrast to the standard account, in which we saw that an entropy gradient is typical only under the assumption of atypical -and time-asymmetric -boundary conditions. Prima facie, it seems plausible that an eternal universe with unbounded entropy would exhibit the U-shaped entropy profile shown in Fig. 3 . For if we start in any macrostate, usual Boltzmannian arguments seem to suggest that typical microstates in the corre- sponding macroregion will lead to a continuous increase of entropy in both time directions (since there are always vastly larger macroregions, corresponding to higher entropy values, that the microstate can evolve into). And then, any sensible regularization of the phase space measure would allow us to conclude that a U-shaped entropy profile is typical tout court, that is, with respect to all possible micro-histories.
However, if we assume a non-normalizable measure and an unbounded entropy, the details of the dynamics and of the phase space partition would arguably play a larger role than in the usual Boltzmannian account. For instance, the measure of low-entropy macroregions could sum up to arbitrarily (even infinitely) large values -exceeding those of the high-entropy regions -or the high-entropy macroregions could be arbitrarily far away in phase space, so that the dynamics do not carry low-entropy configurations into high-entropy regions on relevant time-scales.
The first important question we have to answer is thus:
1. Are there any interesting and realistic dynamics that give rise to typical macro-histories as envisioned by Carroll and Chen?
The second important question that we shall address later (in section 4) is:
2. Can the Carroll model ground sensible statistical inferences about the thermodynamic history of our universe without assuming (something akin to) a Past Hypothesis?
With respect to the first question, Carroll and Chen (2004) propose a model of eternal spontaneous inflation in which new baby universes (or "pocket universes") are repeatedly branching off existing ones. The authors argue that the late stages of any such universe will look like an almost empty de-Sitter space, whose vaccum is unstable and will give rise to bubbles of spontaneous inflation due to quantum fluctations of the inflaton field. This process occurs in both time directions from any Cauchy surface. The birth of a new universe would then increase the overall entropy of the multiverse, while the baby universes themselves are supposed to begin in a low-entropy state (note that Carroll and Chen avoid the term "multiverse" though it is used in Carroll (2010)). This means, in particular, that our observed universe can look like a low-entropy universe, with an even lower-entropy past, even when the state of the multiverse as a whole is arbitrarily high up the entropy curve. While this model is obviously very intriguing, it is also highly speculative, and the authors do not provide concrete dynamics or a precise definition of the entropy to substantiate their claims.
In more recent talks, Carroll discusses a simple toy model -essentially an ideal gas without a box -in which a system of N free particles can expand without bound.
The only macrovariable considered is the moment of inertia,
i providing a measure for the expansion of the system. It is then easy to see that I will attain a minimal value at some moment in time t 0 , from which it grows to infinity in both time directions (cf. equation (7) below). The same will hold for the associated entropy since a macroregion, corresponding to a fixed value of I, is just a sphere of radius √ I in the position coordinates (while all momenta are constant). The entropy curve will thus have the suggested U-shape with vertex at t = t 0 . A detailed discussion of this toy model can be found in Reichert (2012) , as well as Goldstein et al. (2016) .
Here, we will not discuss these two models in any more detail. Instead, we are going to argue that there exists a dynamical theory fitting Carroll's entropy model that is much less speculative than baby universes and much more interesting, physically, than a freely expanding system of point particles. This theory is Newtonian gravity. It will also allow us to draw interesting comparisons between the ideas of Carroll and Chen and those of Barbour, Koslowski and Mercati.
Entropy of a classical gravitating system
There is a lot of confusion and controversy about the statistical mechanics of classical gravitating systems, despite the fact that statistical methods are commonly and successfully used in areas of astrophysics that are essentially dealing with the Newtonian N -body problem (see e.g. Heggie and Hut (2003) ). (An excellent paper clearing up much of the confusion is Wallace (2010) ; see Callender (2009) for some problematic aspects of the statistical mechanics of gravitating systems and Padmanabhan (2000) for a mathematical treatment.) Some examples of common claims are: a) Boltzmann's statistical mechanics is not applicable to systems in which gravity is the dominant force.
b) The Boltzmann entropy of a classical gravitating system is ill-defined or infinite.
c) An entropy increasing evolution for a gravitating system is exactly opposite to that of an ideal gas. While the tendency of the latter is to expand into a uniform configuration, the tendency of the former is to clump into one big cluster.
We believe that the first two propositions are simply false, while the third is at least misleading. However, rather than arguing against these claims in the abstract, we will provide a demonstration to the contrary by proposing an analysis of a classical gravitating system in the framework of Boltzmann's statistical mechanics.
We start by looking at the naive calculation, along the lines of the standard textbook computation for an ideal gas, that finds the Boltzmann entropy of the classical gravitating system to be infinite (see e.g. Kiessling (2001) ). For simplicity, we always assume N particles of equal mass m. We have
with
and
For N > 2, the integral (4) diverges due to the singularity of the gravitational potential at the origin. This result can also be expressed in the form that the microcanonical measure is non-normalizable for a system with gravity. Note that in the present context, there are no physical boundaries (i.e. no box) confining the particles to a given volume. The macrovariable V rather describes a volume (e.g. the smallest sphere, or cuboid, or convex set) enclosing the particle configuration in empty space. There is nothing mathematically wrong with the above calculation. It just doesn't actually compute what it's supposed to. One problem is that as we integrate over V N , we sum over all possible configurations of N particles (with total energy E) within the volume V . This includes configurations in which the particles are homogeneously distributed, but also configurations in which most particles are concentrated in a small subset of V . In the case of the ideal gas in a box, the contribution of the latter is negligible, since almost the entire phase space volume is concentrated on spatially homogeneous configurations. It is the entropy (respectively phase space volume) of this equilibrium state that we actually want to compute, and the mistake we make by including nonequilibrium configurations (in which the particles are concentrated in one half, or one quarter or one third, etc. of the volume) is so small that it is hardly ever mentioned.
In the case of a gravitating system, the situation is distinctly different since the spatial configuration is correlated with the kinetic energy or, in other words, with the possible momentum configurations of the system. Simply put, for an attractive potential and constant energy, a more concentrated spatial configuration corresponds to larger phase space volume in the momentum variables. The "total volume" V is thus not a good macrovariable to describe a system with gravity. In particular, if we want to know whether the entropy of a gravitating system is increasing as the system clusters, we have to consider a macroscopic variable that actually distinguishes between more and less clustered configurations.
We thus propose to describe a system of N gravitating point particles by the following set of macrovariables:
Gm 2 |q i −q j | is the total energy of the system which is a constant of motion.
•
q j ) 2 is the moment of inertia that will quantify how much the particles are spread out over space. In the center of mass frame -which we can and will use without loss of generality -, it simplifies to I(q) = mq 2 = N i=1 mq 2 i . Recall that the system is not confined by physical boundaries but can expand arbitrarily in empty space.
The moment of inertia alone is still too coarse to differentiate between, let's say, a uniform configuration and a concentrated cluster with few residual particles far away. To distinguish between more and less clustered configurations, we thus have to introduce a further macrovariable. We choose:
Gm 2 |q i −q j | , which is just the absolute value of the potential energy. Since the total energy is E(q, p) = T (p) + V (q), specifying the value of E and U is equivalent to specifying E and the kinetic energy
2m . An increase of U (q) thus signifies both clustering and heating of the system.
Note that defining macrostates in terms of U (respectively the potential energy) automatically takes care of the ultraviolet divergence in the computation of the associated entropy since the minimal particle distance r is bounded as r ≥ Gm 2 U . Now, to determine the entropy of the respective macrostates, we have to compute the phase space volume corresponding to a macroregion Γ(E, I, U ), that is
for fixed values of E, I, and U . Unfortunately, we weren't able to solve this integral analytically (and maybe this is, in fact, impossible). However, if we replace the sharp values of the macrovariables with a small intervall I(q) ∈ (I − ∆I, I + ∆I), |V (q)| ∈ (U − ∆U, U + ∆U ) with e.g. ∆I =
(roughly a standard deviation), we can obtain the bounds:
for sufficiently large values of I and U (more precisely, of the dimensionless quantity √ IU Gm 5/2 ) and non-negative energy, where C is a positive constant depending only on N and m. A precise statement and proof (valid for any E) is given in the appendix. Thus, ignoring an additive constant,
Typical evolutions
We now provide a discussion of this result.
1. With our choice of macrovariables, the associated Boltzmann entropy of a gravitating system is well-defined and finite. We also see that the entropy can grow without bounds, either due to continuous expansion of the system (I → +∞) and/or due to continuous clustering and self-heating (U → +∞).
2. While common wisdom says that the typical evolution of a gravitating system is one of clumping and clustering, our computation shows that clustering and expansion (as quantified by the macrovariable U and I, respectively) can contribute equally to an increase of entropy. This fits well with the observed processes of gravithermal collapse that are known to show a "core-halo" pattern (see e.g. Heggie and Hut (2003, Ch. 23) ): the configuration of masses splits into a core that collapses and heats up (increase of U ) and a collection of particles on the outskirts that are blown away (increase of I).
On even larger (cosmological) scales, a gravitating system in a homogeneous configuration can increase its entropy along both "dimensions" by forming many local clusters ("galaxies") that disperse away from each other -a process that would look very much like structure formation! Hence, it seems to be precisely the interplay between the opposing tendencies of clustering and expansion that makes classical gravity much more interesting, from a thermodynamic point of view, than often assumed.
3. Analytical and numerical results support the conclusion that the typical evolution of a gravitating system is one in which the entropy (6) increases from a minimum value in both time directions, giving rise to the U-shaped entropy curves proposed by Carroll and Chen.
The first analytical result is the classical Lagrange-Jacobi equation for the gravitational potential:Ï = 4E − 2V.
From this equation, which is a standard result in analytical mechanics, it follows immediately that if E ≥ 0, the second time derivative of the moment of inertia is strictly positive (note that V is negative), meaning that I(t) is a strictly convex ("upwards curving") function. Together with the fact that I → ∞ as t → ±∞, which follows, for instance, from the results Pollard (1967) , we can conclude that the graph of I has precisely the kind of U-shape that we expect for the entropy.
Thanks to the results of Saari (1971) and Marchal and Saari (1974) , we have an even more precise picture of the asymptotic behavior of the Newtonian gravita-tional N -particle system. Their work studies the inter-particle distances |q i − q j |, as well as the dispersion from the center of mass, for t → ∞ independent of the total energy. It is found that either the minimal particle distance goes to zero
while the greatest particle distance goes to infinity faster than t
or, the asymptotic behavior in the center-of-mass frame is characterized by
where A i ∈ R 3 are constant vectors (possibly the zero vector). Note that since the dynamics are time-reversal invariant, the results hold for t → −∞, as well.
The first case describes so-called "super-hyperbolic escape". This scenario is consistent with an increase of our gravitational entropy (6), implying both I → ∞ and U → ∞ as t → ∞. It also includes, however, the atypical case in which solutions diverge in finite time. It is the second case (when super-hyperbolic escape is excluded), in which the Newtonian N -body system is much more interesting and generally well-behaved. More precisely, we see that if (8) holds, all inter-particle distances fall into one of the following three classes (see Saari (1971) , Cor. 1.1, together with Marchal and Saari (1974) , Cor. 6):
for large t and positive constants L, L ij .
The result can be summarized as follows (cf. Saari (1971) , p. 227): On sufficiently large time-scales, the system forms clusters, consisting of particles whose mutual distances remain bounded. These clusters form subsystems (clusters of clusters) that are reasonably well isolated (energy and angular momentum are asymptoti-cally conserved in each one of them separately), the distance between their centers of mass growing proportional to t. Finally, within each of these subsystems, the clusters separate approximately as t 2/3 . In other words, the long-term behavior of such a Newtonian universe looks very much like structure formation, with local clumping into "galaxies" and global expansion due to galaxies and galaxy clusters receding from each other. Even quantitatively, the result fits reasonably well with the behavior of our actual universe: identifying a "scale factor" a(t) with the typical inter-galaxy distance, we find H(t) =ȧ a ∼ t −1 for large t, consistent with Hubble's law for a universe dominated by matter and/or radiation.
In regard to entropic considerations, i.e. equation (6), we note that the moment of inertia will grow asymptotically like I(t) ∼ t 2 , while the macrovariable U (t) is at least bounded from below by some multiple of N L 2 (assuming that the number of particles in a cluster is of order N ). What happens at intermediate times?
Assuming henceforth a non-negative total energy, we already know that I(t) is strictly convex. Together with its quadratic growth for t → ±∞, we can conclude that it has a unique global minimum, let's say at t = τ , from which it grows in both time directions. U (t) will in general fluctuate, but if we exclude particle collisions and "near particle collisions" (very close encounters), it will remain bounded and not fluctuate too quickly (U remains bounded, as well). Hence, we expect that the graph of (E + U (t))I(t) (the logarithm of which is proportional to our gravitational entropy) looks qualitatively like that of I(t), namely by and large parabolic. Indeed, numerical simulations by Barbour et al. (2013 Barbour et al. ( , 2015 for the E = 0 universe (with N = 1000 and random initial data) support the claim that the evolution of I · U is well interpolated by a parabola of the form α(t − τ ) 2 + β with α, β > 0. All this suggests the desired U-shaped evolution of the entropy S(E, I, U ) ≈ 3N 2 log(E + U ) + log(I) as a function of time for a Newtonian gravitating universe with non-negative energy. (Actually, on large time-scales, the shape looks less like a U and more like -how some children draw birds on the horizon -since S(t) grows only logarithmically as |t − τ | → ∞.) Can Carroll's entropy model ground sensible statistical inferences about the thermodynamic history of our universe without assuming (something akin to) a Past Hypothesis?
To approach this issue -and clarify the role of the PH in the standard account -we have to disentangle two questions that are often confounded in such discussions: i) Given the fundamental laws of nature, what do typical macro-histories of the universe look like? In particular: is the existence of a thermodynamic arrow typical?
ii) Given our knowledge about the present state of the universe, what can we reasonably infer about its past and future?
The answer to question i) will in general depend on the dynamical laws as well as cosmological considerations. If we have infinite time and a finite maximal entropy, a typical macro-history will be in thermodynamic equilibrium almost all the time, but also exhibit arbitrarily deep fluctuations into low-entropy states, leading to periods with a distinct entropy gradient, i.e. a local thermodynamic arrow. This was precisely Boltzmann's fluctuation scenario discussed in section 1. And this scenario, we saw, leads us into the Boltzmann brain problem and to the unreliability of records, unless we add the additional postulate -a form of Past Hypothesis -that the present macrostate is not the bottom of the fluctuation, but has been preceded by a sufficiently long period of entropy increase from a state of much lower entropy, still. In this context, the PH would thus serve a self-locating function, taking the form of an indexical proposition that locates our present state on the upwards-slope of a particularly deep fluctuation (Fig. 4) . The now standard account assumes a bounded entropy and a relatively young universe -about 13.8 billion years according to estimates based on standard big bang cosmology. In this setting (we interpret the big bang as the actual beginning of time), a typical history would not have any thermodynamic arrow at all (the time-scale of ∼ 10 10 years is too short for significant entropy fluctuations on cosmological scales). Thus, we need the PH not just for self-location but to account for the existence of a thermodynamic arrow in the first place by postulating a low-entropy boundary condition at the big bang. A self-locating proposition is still crucial and hidden in the assumption of a young universe. Without this assumption -and assuming that the universe is eternal in the future time direction -we would essentially be back in a fluctuation scenario with all its Boltzmann-brain-like absurdities. In a future-eternal universe with bounded entropy, there are still arbitrarily many entropy-fluctuations that are just deep enough to produce for our present configuration (but not much deeper). And we would still have to conclude that we are much more likely in one of these fluctuations than on the initial upwards slope originating in the low-entropy beginning of the universe (cf. Loewer (forthcoming)).
The self-locating role of the PH is thus indespensible; and it is, in fact, the indexical proposition involved, rather than the non-dynamical boundary condition, that we would be surprised to find among the fundamental laws of nature as we consider this option for the status of the Past Hypothesis. Carroll's model, finally, postulates an eternal universe and unbounded entropy, suggesting that typical macro-histories will have the U-shaped entropy profile depicted in Fig. 3 . If this works out -and we see no reason why it couldn't, at least in principle, even if one has doubts that Newtonian gravity provides an actual example -the existence of a thermodynamic arrow (respectively two opposite ones) would actually be typical. (For completeness, we could also discuss the option of a temporally finite universe and unbounded entropy, but this model does not seem advantageous and goes beyond the scope of the paper.) In the upshot, the Carroll model can indeed explain the existence of a thermodynamic arrow without invoking a PH as a fundamental postulate over and above the microscopic laws and the pertinent typicality measure. It may still turn out that the theory requires a PH for its self-locating function, if it would otherwise imply that our current macrostate is the global entropy minimum, i.e. has not evolved from a lower entropy past. The relevant version of the PH may then take the form of an indexical clause -stating that our present state is high up the entropy curve -or be a characterization of the entropy minimum (Janus point) of our universe. (In the first case, the PH would first and foremost locate the present moment within the history of an eternal Carroll universe, in the latter, it would first and foremost locate the actual universe within the set of possible ones.) But it is not obvious why the Carroll model would lead to the conclusion that we are currently at, or near, the entropy minimum, and the issue actually belongs to our second question -how to make inferences about the past -to which we shall now turn.
Predictions and Retrodictions
The most straightforward response to question ii) -how to make inferences about the past or future -is the following method of statistical reasoning: Observe the current state of the universe (respectively a suitably isolated subsystem), restrict the pertinent probability (more correctly: typicality) measure to the corresponding macroregion in phase space, and use the conditional measure to make probabilistic inferences about the history of the system. We shall call this naive evidential reasoning (reviving a terminology introduced in an unpublished 2011 draft of Goldstein et al., 2016) . The negative connotation is warranted, because we know that while this kind of reasoning works well for predictions -inferences about the future -it leads to absurd, if not self-refuting, conclusions when applied for retrodictions -i.e. inferences about the past.
The now standard move to avoid this predicament is to employ the PH to block naive evidential reasoning in the time direction of the low-entropy boundary condition. For sensible retrodictions, we learn, one must conditionalize on the low-entropy initial state in addition to the observed present state. It is rarely, if ever, noted that an appeal to a PH may be sufficient but not necessary at this point. The key is to appreciate that the second question -how to make inferences about the past and future of the universe -must be addressed subsequently to the first -whether a thermodynamic arrow in the universe is typical. For if we have good reasons to believe that we live in a universe with a thermodynamic arrow of time, this fact alone is sufficient to conclude the irrationality of retrodicting by conditionalizing the phase space measure on the present macrostate. More precisely, it follows from the Boltzmannian analysis that in a system with a thermodynamic arrow, the evolution towards the future (the direction of entropy increase) looks like a typical one relative to any intermediate macrostate, while the actual microstate is necessarily atypical with respect to its evolution towards the entropic past (see Fig. 5 ). This is essentially the reversal of the familiar paradox that entropy increase in both time directions comes out as typical relative to any non-equilibrium macrostate.
In the upshot, the fact that naive evidential reasoning doesn't work towards the entropic past can be inferred from the existence of a thermodynamic arrow; it does not have to be inferred from the assumption of a special initial state. The explanation of the thermodynamic arrow, in turn, may or may not require a special initial state, but this is a different issue. If the relevant physical theory tells us that typical universes have a thermodynamic arrow, we have a very strong theoretical justification for believing that we actually live in a universe with a thermodynamic arrow. And if we believe that we live in a universe with a thermodynamic arrow, a rational method for making inferences about the past is not naive evidential reasoning but inference to the best explanation. Rather than asking "what past state (or states) would be typical given our present macrostate?", we should ask "what past state (or states) would make our present macrostate typical?". In more technical terms, rather than adjusting our credence that the past macrostate was M 0 according to P(M 0 | M act ), we should "bet" on macrostates M 0 that maximize P(M act | M 0 ). If we find a dinosaur bone, we should infer a past state containing a dinosaur. If we find history books with information about Napoleon, we should infer a past state containing a French emperor by the name of Napoleon. We do not claim that this amounts to a full-fledged analysis of the epistemic asymmetry, but it is a large enough part, at least, to uphold the reliability of records and get a more fine-grained analysis going. In particular, considering the universe as a whole, the fact that it has evolved from a lower-entropy state in the past is inferred, rather than assumed, by this kind of abductive reasoning.
By now it should be clear that the debate is not about whether some version of the PH is true, but about whether it is an axiom. And the upshot of our discussion is that if the existence of a thermodynamic arrow in the universe turns out to be typical, we can consider our knowledge of the low-entropy past to be reasonably grounded in empirical evidence and our "best" theory of the microscopic dynamics (as any knowledge about our place in the history of the universe arguably should).
Another way to phrase the above analysis goes as follows: Naive evidential reasoning applied to both time directions will always lead to the conclusion that the current macrostate is the (local) entropy minimum. However, if we know that we observe a universe (or any other system) with a thermodynamic arrow, we also know that this conclusion would be wrong almost all the time. More precisely, it would be wrong unless we happen to observe a very special period in the history of the universe in which it is close to its entropy minimum.
Goldstein, Tumulka and Zanghì (2016) provide a mathematical analysis of this issue in the context of Carroll's toy model of freely expanding particles. Their discussion shows that the two opposing ways of reasoning -typical microstates within a given macroregion versus typical time-periods in a history characterized by a U-shaped entropy curve -come down to different ways of regularizing the unbounded phase space measure by choosing an appropriate cut-off. Goldstein et al. then argue against the first option, corresponding to naive evidential reasoning, by saying that certain facts about the past amount to "pretheoretical" knowledge. In contrast, our arguments for the same conclusion are based on a theoretical (Boltzmannian) analysis. Nonetheless, from a formal point of view, a certain ambiguity remains. In the next section, we will discuss how the relational framework of Barbour et al. is able to improve upon this situation.
The mystery of our low-entropy universe
Another possible objection to the Carroll model (disregarding the multiverse proposal) goes as follows: Doesn't the fact that the entropy of the universe could be arbitrarily high make its present very low value -and the even lower value at the Janus point -only more mysterious? In other words: doesn't the fact that the entropy could have been arbitrarily high just increase whatever explanatory pressure there was to account for the specialness of our universe?
While we cannot completely deny the legitimacy of this worry, our intuition is that the Carroll model precludes any a priori expectation of what the entropy of the universe should be. If it can be arbitrarily (but not infinitely) large, any possible value could be considered "mysteriously low" by skeptics.
Sidney Morgenbesser famously responded to the ontological question Why is there something rather than nothing: "If there was nothing, you'd be still complaining!" In the same spirit (though not quite as funny), our reaction to the question Why is the entropy of the universe so low? would be: "If it was any higher, you'd be still complaining!"
We concede, however, that divergent intuitions about this question are possible. In fact, the ambiguity is once again paralleled by mathematical issues arising from the nonnormalizability of the phase space measure. Note that when Penrose (1999) estimates that the entropy of the universe near the big bang could have been about 10 123 times higher, the real worry is not that the actual value was so low in comparison, but that a 10 123 times higher entropy would seem to be 10 10 123 more likely. While this conclusion is questionable even in the usual Boltzmann framework (assuming a finite phase space volume), the interpretation of a non-normalizable phase space measure as a probability measure is problematic, to say the least, leading in particular to the paradox that any finite range of entropy values has probability zero. Again, we'll have to leave it at that as far as the discussion of the Carroll model is concerned, turning instead to the question if and how the shape space theory of Barbour et al. is able to resolve the issue.
Gravity and typicality from a relational point of view
Starting from Machian/Leibnizian principles, Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati (2013 , 2014 , 2015 discuss the Newtonian gravitational system from a relational perspective. According to the framework that Barbour has championed over the past decades, all physical degrees of freedom are described on shape space which is obtained from Newtonion configuration space by factoring out absolute rotations, translations and scale, leaving us with a 3N − 7 dimensional space for an N -particle system. The configuration of N point particles is then characterized by the angles and ratios between their (Euclidean) distance vectors -or, in other words, by its shape -independent of extrinsic scales. The lowest-dimensional shape space is that of N = 3 particles. In this case, the shapes are those of triangles -specified by 2 angles or the ratios between 3 distances -and the topology of shape space is that of a 2-dimensional (projective) sphere.
Considering standard Newtonian gravity on absolute space and trying to extract, so to speak, its relational essence, we restrict ourselves to models with vanishing total momentum (P = N i=1 p i ≡ 0) and angular momentum, (L = N i=1 q i × p i ≡ 0) excluding rotating universes and propagations of the center of mass, respectively. Arbitrary solutions of Newtonian mechanics could be projected onto shape space, but the total angular momentum of the universe (let's say) could not be captured by relational initial data. (It corresponds to a particular choice of absolute spatio-temporal reference frame ("gauge") from the point of view of the shape space theory; see Dürr et al. (2018) for a good technical discussion.) The only canonical choice -and the only choice suggested by Machian principles (since independent of absolute orientation) -is L = 0. Similarly, the rejection of absolute time-scales leads to considering only universes with zero total energy (E ≡ 0) since this is the only value invariant under a rescaling of units.
The problematic issue, when it comes to Newtonian gravity, is its lack of scaleinvariance. Newtonian gravity has models that do not rotate (L ≡ 0) and models that do not propagate (P ≡ 0) but it does not have models that do not expand
The characteristic size of an N -particle system is given by σ = I m , where
i is the center-of-mass moment of inertia, and we have already discussed the behaviour of I(t) in section 3.1: it is roughly parabolic as a function of time, growing in both time directions from its global minimum.
In fact, revisiting the Lagrange-Jacobi identity (7) for non-negative energy, we see that I = const. ⇔ D ≡ 0 is only possible for homogeneous potentials of degree k = −2. This has motivated the alternative, scale-invariant theory of gravitation proposed in Barbour (2003) . Largely rescinding this earlier approach (precisely because they seek to obtain an arrow of time), Barbour et al. (2015) start from standard Newtonian gravity, with the familiar 1 r -potential, which is not scale-invariant in the relevant sense. To repeat: an N -particle universe interacting by Newton's law of gravitation always changes in size.
Of course, we can (and will) insist that an absolute change in size is unphysical from a relational point of view, but note that the process has dynamical (and in this sense observable) consequences. Simply put: for constant energy, a gravitating universe that expands also slows down. (Compare: absolute rotations are meaningless on shape space, but the centrifugal forces predicted by Newtonian mechanics would be observable through their effect on the particle motions; cf. Maudlin (2012) for an excellent discussion of this issue going back to the famous Leibniz-Clarke debate). Conversely, if we eliminate scale (somewhat artificially) by a time-dependent coordinate transformation q → q σ(t) , the resulting dynamics can be represented on shape space but will no longer have the standard Newtonian form. Instead, the dynamics become non-autonomous (time-dependent) with scale acting essentially like friction (Barbour et al., 2014) .
A few more insights from the analysis of Barbour et al. are important to our discussion. First, since the dilatational momentum D = 1 2İ is monotonously increasing (recall thaẗ I > 0 by equation (7)), it can be used as an internal time-parameter. We then note that D = 0 precisely when I reaches its global minimum, i.e. at the Janus point. Therefore, D = 0 is also called the central time.
Second, while Newtonian gravity is not scale-invariant, it doesn't depend on an absolute scale either, but only on relative scales (the size of the system at one moment as compared to its size at another). That is because for any potential which is homogeneous of degree k, a global rescaling q → αq for constant α > 0 can be compensated by corresponding change in time-units, t → α 1−k/2 t. Now, for Newtonian gravity (and E = 0), we know that the size of the system has a unique global minimum at D = 0. This central configuration can thus be used as a natural reference point to eliminate extrinsic scale.
With all that has been said and done so far, physically distinct solutions -from the relational perspective -can be parametrized by scale-invariant mid-point data specified at central time, and the corresponding solution space Γ sol turns out to be isomorphic to the cotangent bundle T * S of shape space (just as Hamiltonian phase space is the cotangent bundle of Newtonian configuration space).
Interestingly, though, there is a further redundancy from the relationalist point of view that Barbour et al. (2015) call dynamical similarity. It comes from the invariance of the shape space equations of motion under a simultaneous rescaling of internal time D and shape momenta. In other words, two solutions are dynamically similar if they describe the same geometric curve in S, even if the curves are run through at different "speeds". Identifying dynamically similar curves, Barbour et al. reduce the space of solutions by one further dimension. Mathematically, the resulting space corresponds to the projective cotangent bundle of shape space, P T * S, which is a compact space. And this is where the relational formulation, i.e. the elimination of absolute degree of freedom, really starts to pay off. For the uniform measure on P T * S, that Barbour et al. take to be the natural typicality measure (following Laplace's principle of indifference), is normalizable and will thus allow for a statistical analysis that avoids the ambiguities which resulted from the infinite phase space measure in the Carroll model. It should be noted that the construction of the measure is not entirely canonical; it involves the choice of a metric on shape space (which, in turn, can be defined through a scale-invariant metric on absolute phase space). We agree that the choice of Barbour et al. (2015) (ds 2 = m I −1 (q) N i=1 dq i · dq i ) is the simplest that comes to mind, but the justification of the typicality measure remains a critical step that would require a more in-depth discussion (Dürr et al. (2018) provides an insightful treatment of typicality measures on shape space, however in the quantum case). In particular, we are rather skeptical of a "principle of indifference" as a motivation for a uniform measure. For the time being, we take the pragmatic attitude that the typicality measure proposed by Barbour, Koslowski and Mercati will be justified by its empirical and explanatory success. Deviating from their notation, we shall denote this measure on the solution space P T * S by µ ε .
Complexity, Entaxy and Entropy
To describe the macro-evolution of a gravitating system on shape space, Barbour et al. introduce a scale-invariant macrovariable C S which they call shape complexity:
to be compared with (6). Recalling our previous discussion (or noting that C S ≈ R/r, where R denotes the largest and r the smallest distance between particles), we see that low shape complexity corresponds to dense homogeneous states in absolute space, while high shape-complexity indicates "structure" -dilute configurations of multiple clusters. Considering the simplest case of N = 3 particles, i.e. 2-dimensional shape space, the configuration of minimal shape complexity is the equilateral triangle, while the configuration of maximal shape complexity corresponds to "binary coincidences" in which the distance between two particles -relative to their distance to the third -is zero. This is to say that 3-particle configurations with high shape complexity will in general contain a Kepler pair with the third particle escaping to infinity.
In section 3.1, we have discussed the typical evolution of −V (t)I(t) and found it to be roughly parabolic. Analogously, one can conclude that the evolution of C S (in Newtonian time) is well-interpolated by a function of the form
The evolution of the shape complexity will thus typically exhibit a V-shaped profile: it has a global minimum at central time τ (corresponding to D = 0), from which it grows roughly linearly (modulo fluctuations) in both time directions. In the terminology of Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati, this defines two opposite gravitational arrows of time with the Janus point as their common past. Note that these are not entropic arrows, though we know from our previous discussion that they will track the entropic arrows that we have identified for the gravitating universe in Newtonian space-time. In fact, an interesting feature of the relational theory is that it reveals the origin of these arrows to be dynamical rather than statistical: the negative of the shape complexity corresponds to the potential that generates the gravitational dynamics on shape space. Hence, configurations are dynamically driven towards higher values of C S .
Figure 6: Top: plot of the shape complexity CS found by numerical simulation for N = 1000 and Gaussian initial data. Bottom: schematic conception (not found by numerical simulation) of three corresponding configurations on Newtonian space-time. Source: Barbour et al. (2015) .
Turning to the statistical analysis of the shape space theory, we are interested in the measure assigned to mid-point data (Janus point configurations) with low shape complexity
respectively high shape complexity
Here, 1 < α ∞ is some positive constant and C min is the smallest possible value of the shape complexity. The key result of the relational statistical analysis (not yet rigorously proven but strongly substantiated by the 3-particle case and numerical experiments for large N ) is now that already for small values of α (α < 2 for large N )
and consequently
This means: it is typical that a universe at the Janus point (the beginning of our macrohistory) is in a very homogeneous state! Regardless of the philosophical merits of relationalism, the shape space theory of Barbour, Koslowski and Mercati thus comes with two great virtues: First, it provides a sensible normalizable measure on the set of possible micro-evolutions that still establishes an arrow of time as typical. Even more spectacularly, typical evolutions with respect to this measure go through very homogeneous configurations at their Janus point (∼ the "big bang"). In other words, initial states that have very low entropy from the absolutist point of view come out as typical in the shape space description -provided that one accepts the proposed measure on the solution space P T * S as a natural typicality measure. This would resolve the two potential problems that we have identified for the Carroll model: the mysteriously low entropy of our universe and the justification for locating our present state reasonably far away from the entropy minimum.
On the other hand, Barbour et al. introduce another concept called (instantaneous) entaxy that we find much less compelling. The instantaneous entaxy (the authors also use the term solution entaxy for the measure µ ε on P T * S) is defined as the measure of a set of relational configurations corresponding to an (approximate) value of shape complexity. It thus seems prima facie analogous to the Boltzmann entropy defined in terms of the macrovariable C S , with the notable exception that it decreases for t → ∞, as the shape complexity increases. Recall, however, that the typicality measure µ ε is defined on midpoint data, or, in other words, by cutting through the space of solution trajectories along their Janus points. Barbour et al. simply extend it to arbitrary (internal) times by ε(C S (t) = C * ) := P T * S δ(C S − C * )dµ ε , that is, the entaxy associated to the shape complexity C S = C * at any point in history corresponds to the measure of solution trajectories with C S = C * at central time. This definition seems somewhat ad hoc and corresponds to comparing macrostates at different times in terms of a measure that is not stationary under the dynamics (phase space volume gets lost, so to speak). Indeed, on the 3-particle shape space, it is not hard to see that the configurations of maximal shape complexity (the "linear configurations") are dynamical attractors; hence, a stationary, continuous measure on shape phase space does not exist. (And even if it did, it would be unclear if stationarity of the phase space measure is a meaningful concept in relational mechanics, since there is no absolute metaphysical sense in which two configurations on different solution trajectories -i.e. belonging to different possible universes -with the same internal time are actually simultaneous; they merely happen to agree on whatever part of feature of the configuration plays the role of a universal "clock".)
For these reasons, the entaxy should not be regarded as a shape analogon of the Boltzmann entropy. In particular, the fact that the gravitational arrows point in the direction of decreasing rather than increasing entaxy is not in contradiction with Boltzmannian arguments. In any case, the entropy concept is so useful because it is related to certain probabilistic inferences, and because it connects -much like the concept of energydifferent theories and levels of descriptions. Barbour's entaxy has yet to earn similar merits. For the purpose of identifying an arrow of time, it doesn't yet do more or less than the shape complexity itself -though it remains to be seen how any of these concepts extends to other dynamics and more detailed characterizations of the universe's macrostate. (For a speculative discussion of shape complexity in quantum mechanics, see Barbour et al. (2013) ; see Barbour et al. (2015) for remarks about general relativity.)
Finally, one may wonder whether a sensible notion of entropy is available also for the shape space theory, or whether we could compute on absolute phase space the entropy associated to the shape complexity or other scale-invariant macrovariables. Note that, for E = 0, our gravitational entropy (6) 
Proof. 
Proof. Applying equation (18) Hence, using a homogeneous phase space measure (such as the Liouville measure or the microcanonical measure for a homogeneous potential and E = 0) macroregions defined in terms of scale-invariant macrovariables must have measure zero or infinity. This suggests that the notion of entropy is, in fact, intimately linked to absolute scales and thus not manifestly relational. Note, in particular, that expansion and heatingprocesses that are paradigmatic for entropy increase (especially, but not exclusively in our analysis of gravitating systems) -require absolutes scales of distance and velocity, respectively. This leaves the relationalist with the following interesting dilemma: Either the notion of entropy is meaningful only for subsystems -for which the environment provides extrinsic scales -, or we have to explain why the entropy of the universe is a useful and important concept despite the fact that it is related to degrees of freedom that are strictly speaking unphysical, corresponding to mere gauge in the shape space theory.
Conclusion
The works of Carroll and Chen as well as Barbour, Koslowski and Mercati show that it is possible to establish an arrow of time as typical, without the need to postulate special boundary conditions or any other form of a Past Hypothesis. By proposing a definition of the Boltzmann entropy of a classical gravitating universe, we argued that Newtonian gravity provides a relevant realization of Carroll's framework that can be compared to the relational theory of Barbour et al. We found, in particular, that the gravitational arrows identified by Barbour et al. in terms of shape complexity will match the entropic arrows in the theory on absolute phase space. The extension to other microscopic theories (and macroscopic state functions) will require further research.
The relationalist and the absolutist approach both provide the resources to avoid the reversibility paradox and to ground sensible inferences about the past and future of the universe. However, while certain ambiguities remain in the Carroll model, resulting from the non-normalizability of the phase space measure, those issues are resolved by the shape space theory of Barbour and collaborators -provided one accepts their choice of typicality measure. In any case, for a Newtonian gravitating universe, their analysis suggests that homogeneous configurations at the "big bang" (central time) are typical, explaining why the universe started in what looks like a very low-entropy state from an absolutist perspective. However, if the shape space theory is actually fundamental, the "entropy of the universe" turns out to be a somewhat spurious concept whose status remains to be discussed in more detail.
Appendix: Computation of the gravitational entropy
We compute the phase space volume of the macroregion Γ(E, I ± I, U ± U ), that is:
Gm 2 |q i − q j | ≤ (1 + )U 1 (1
with the Hamiltonian
Gm 2 |q i − q j | .
We shall prove the following
Proposition.
If the scale invariant quantity √ IU is large enough that
we obtain the bounds:
|Γ(E, I ± I, U ± U )| ≥ CN 2 e For non-negative E, this can be simplified further by using (E +(1+ )U ) n ≤ (1+ ) n (E + U ) n ≤ e n (E + U ) n , respectively (E + (1 − )U ) n ≥ (1 − ) n ≥ e −2 n (E + U ) n , for < 1 2 .
Proof. We first perform the integral over the momentum variables and are left with (2m)
Gm 2 |q i − q j | ≤ (1 + )U 1 (1 − )I ≤ with ξ = ξ(I, N ) to be determined soon. That is, we consider a series of concentric spheres around the origin, their radii being an increasing multiple of ξ, and configurations for which the volume between two spheres is alternately empty or occupied by a single particle. For B, we have mq 2 ∈ [I + − ∆I, I + ] with
We thus set
so that I + = I. Furthermore, for q ∈ B, the distance between two particles is bounded from below by |q i − q j | ≥ (2(j − i) − 1)ξ, and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, there exists less than N particle pairs with j − i = k. Hence, the potential energy is bounded by
by (21), where we used In particular, we know that for q ∈ B and e. Hence: , one checks that 
